Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited

Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 56, issue 3, 350-354

Abstract: This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Keywords: Indivisibles; Fairness; Coalitionally; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(08)00051-6
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:3:p:350-354

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().