Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

No 2006:11, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Keywords: Indivisible objects; fairness; coalitionally strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2006-05-03, Revised 2007-12-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Andersson, Tommy and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 'Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited' in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, pages 350-354.

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2006_011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-22007 Lund, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Iker Arregui Alegria ().