Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes

Michel Truchon and Stephen Gordon

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, vol. 57, issue 2, 199-212

Abstract: If individual voters observe the true ranking on a set of alternatives with error, then the problem of aggregating their observations is one of statistical inference. This study develops a statistical methodology that can be used to evaluate the properties of a given voting or aggregation rule. These techniques are then applied to some well-known rules.

Keywords: Vote; aggregation; Ranking; rules; Maximum; likelihood; Optimal; inference; Monte; Carlo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(08)00108-X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Statistical Comparison of Aggregation Rules for Votes (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:57:y:2009:i:2:p:199-212

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().