Statistical Comparison of Aggregation Rules for Votes

Michel Truchon and Stephen Gordon

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: If individual voters observe the true ranking on a set of alternatives with error, then the social choice problem, that is, the problem of aggregating their observations, is one of statistical inference. This study develops a statistical methodology that can be used to evaluate the properties of a given or aggregation rule. These techniques are then applied to some well-known rules.

Keywords: Vote aggregation; ranking rules; figure skating; maximum likelihood; optimal inference; Monte Carlo; Kemeny; Borda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-ecm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0625

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