Solidarity in games with a coalition structure

Emilio Calvo Ramón () and Esther Gutiérrez

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, vol. 60, issue 3, 196-203

Abstract: A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.

Keywords: Games; with; a; coalition; structure; Owen; value; The; two-step; Shapley; value; Solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(10)00072-7
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Solidarity in games with a coalition structure (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:3:p:196-203

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().