Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
Emilio Calvo () and
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, vol. 60, issue 3, 196-203
A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
Keywords: Games; with; a; coalition; structure; Owen; value; The; two-step; Shapley; value; Solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Solidarity in games with a coalition structure (2010)
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