Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
Emilio Calvo () and
Maria Esther Gutierrez ()
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Maria Esther Gutierrez: Universidad del País Vasco/E.H.U
No 810, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES
A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo, 2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
Keywords: Games; with; a; coalition; structure.; Owen; value.; The; two-step; Shapley; value.; Solidarity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-net
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Journal Article: Solidarity in games with a coalition structure (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0810
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