The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems

Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris () and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, vol. 62, issue 2, 87-90

Abstract: In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:87-90

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