The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems

Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris () and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

No 205, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strate- gic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.

Keywords: Proportional Election; Strategic Voting; Ideological Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2011-03, Revised 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper205.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:205

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Pelagatti ().