Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 64, issue 2, 159-165

Abstract: We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Nash Equilibria of Network Formation Games under Consent (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:2:p:159-165

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.005

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