Nash Equilibria of Network Formation Games under Consent

Robert Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi

No 11-03, Economics Working Papers from Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast

Abstract: We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

Keywords: Social networks; Strong link deletion proofness; Nash equilibrium; Higher orders of stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2011-11
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Journal Article: Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent (2012)
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