Rational self-sabotage

Oliver Gürtler and Johannes Münster

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 1, 1-4

Abstract: We consider a dynamic tournament where contestants choose a productive effort and to help or sabotage their opponents. Sabotage lowers the output of the victim. Moreover, sabotage imposes an additional direct psychic cost on the victim. Because the current leader is sabotaged most strongly in the final stage, players help other players and even sabotage themselves early on.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:1:p:1-4

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.06.008

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