Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method

Alexander Karpov

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 74, issue C, 1-7

Abstract: This paper studies the incentives for alliance (coalition) formation. It provides an example of an alliance that leads to unlimited seat gains. A full description of a set that guarantees the lack of successful alliance is found. The probability of the lack of successful alliances is evaluated. A game-theoretical approach for alliance formation is applied.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016548961400095X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Apparentement incentives under the d’Hondt method (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:74:y:2015:i:c:p:1-7

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.12.001

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().