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Apparentement incentives under the d’Hondt method

Alexander Karpov ()

No 896, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper provides an example of sole apparentement (coalition) that leads to unlimited seat losses. The necessary and sufficient condition of the lack of successful apparentements is discovered. A precise description of an apparentement-proof set is recognized. The probability of the lack of successful apparentement is evaluated. A game-theoretical approach for apparentement formation is applied.

Pages: 22pages
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP896.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method (2015) Downloads
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