Apparentement incentives under the d’Hondt method
Alexander Karpov ()
No 896, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research
This paper provides an example of sole apparentement (coalition) that leads to unlimited seat losses. The necessary and sufficient condition of the lack of successful apparentements is discovered. A precise description of an apparentement-proof set is recognized. The probability of the lack of successful apparentement is evaluated. A game-theoretical approach for apparentement formation is applied.
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Journal Article: Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:896
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