Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update

William Thomson

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 74, issue C, 41-59

Abstract: A group of agents have claims on a resource but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? A group of agents decide to undertake a public project that they can jointly afford. How much should each of them contribute? This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (154)

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Working Paper: Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:74:y:2015:i:c:p:41-59

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.002

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