Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 74, issue C, 41-59
A group of agents have claims on a resource but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? A group of agents decide to undertake a public project that they can jointly afford. How much should each of them contribute? This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems.
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Working Paper: Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update (2013)
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