Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
No 578, RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
A group of agents have claims on a resource, but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? A group of agents decide to undertake a public project that they can jointly afford. How much should each of them contribute? This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems.
Keywords: claims problems; constrained equal awards rule; constrained equal losses rule; proportional rule; axiomatic approach; game-theoretic approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update (2015)
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