Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
Topi Miettinen () and
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 76, issue C, 12-18
We extend the Ståhl–Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining procedure to allow players to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie prior to, and for the duration of, each bargaining round. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the committed share, then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome exhibits a second mover advantage. In particular, as the horizon approaches infinity, and commitment costs approach zero, the unique bargaining outcome corresponds to the reversed Rubinstein outcome (δ/(1+δ),1/(1+δ)), where δ is the common discount factor.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:76:y:2015:i:c:p:12-18
Access Statistics for this article
Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier
More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().