Charity auctions for the happy few

Olivier Bos

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol. 79, issue C, 83-92

Abstract: Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than either winner-pay auctions or lotteries. We demonstrate that first-price and second-price winner-pay auctions have a better revenue performance than first-price and second-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. Lotteries can also provide higher revenue than all-pay auctions. To prove this, we consider a framework with complete information. Complete information is helpful and may reflect events that occur, for instance, in a local service club (such as a voluntary organization) or at a show-business dinner.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Charity auctions for the happy few (2016)
Working Paper: Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (2015)
Working Paper: Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (2010)
Working Paper: Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:79:y:2016:i:c:p:83-92

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.002

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