Charity Auctions for the Happy Few

Olivier Bos

No 45, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay auctions. We demonstrate that the first-price and second-price winner-pay auctions outperform the first-price and second-price all-pay auction when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. To prove it, we consider a framework with complete information. Complete information is realistic and corresponds to events that occur, for instance, in a local service club (such as a voluntary organization) or in a show business dinner.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; charity; complete information; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D62 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Charity auctions for the happy few (2016)
Working Paper: Charity auctions for the happy few (2016)
Working Paper: Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (2015)
Working Paper: Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kls:series:0045

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