Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model

Abhinaba Lahiri, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 150-159

Abstract: We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modeled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the distance of their dips to the nearer public bad (myopic preferences) or, lexicographically, by the distance to the nearer and the other public bad (lexmin preferences). A (social choice) rule takes a profile of reported preferences as input and assigns the location of the public bad in each country. For the case of myopic preferences, all rules satisfying strategy-proofness, country-wise Pareto optimality, non-corruptibility, and the far away condition are characterized. These rules pick only border locations. The same holds for lexmin preferences under strategy-proofness and country-wise Pareto optimality alone.

Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016548961630052X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:150-159

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.001

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().