Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model

A. Lahiri, Hans Peters and A.J.A. Storcken
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A. Lahiri: Quantitative Economics
A.J.A. Storcken: Quantitative Economics

No 7, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modelled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the location of the nearest public bad to their dips. A social choice function or rule takes a profile of reported preferences as input and assigns the location of the public bad in each country. All rules satisfying strategy-proofness, country-specific Pareto optimality, non-corruptibility, and the far away condition are characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations.

Date: 2015-01-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015007

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015007

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