Mutually best matches

Hannu Salonen and Mikko A.A. Salonen

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 91, issue C, 42-50

Abstract: We study iterated formation of mutually best matches (IMB) in college admissions problems. When IMB produces a non-wasteful matching, the matching has many good properties like Pareto optimality and stability. Moreover, in this case IMB selects the unique core allocation and truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium for students. If preferences satisfy a single peakedness condition, or have a single crossing property, then IMB is guaranteed to produce a non-wasteful matching. These properties guarantee also that the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Top Trading Cycles algorithm (TTC) produce the same matching as IMB. We compare these results with some well-known results about when DA is Pareto optimal, or when DA and TTC produce the same matching.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016548961730001X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Mutually Best Matches (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:91:y:2018:i:c:p:42-50

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.11.003

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().