Mutually Best Matches

Hannu Salonen and Mikko A.A. Salonen
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Mikko A.A. Salonen: Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER), University of Helsinki

No 109, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: We study iterated formation of mutually best matches (IMB) in college admissions problems. When IMB produces a maximal individually rational matching, the matching has many good properties like Pareto optimality and stability. If preferences satisfy a single peakedness condition, or have a single crossing property, then IMB produces a maximal individually rational matching. These properties guarantee also that the student proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Top Trading Cycles algorithm (TTC) produce the same matching as IMB. We compare these results with some well-known results about when DA is Pareto optimal, or when DA and TTC produce the same matching.

Keywords: Matching; School choice; College admission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Mutually best matches (2018)
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