Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility

Bas Dietzenbacher

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 92, issue C, 16-21

Abstract: This paper analyzes bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptcy games with monetary payoffs. Following the game theoretic approach to NTU-bankruptcy problems, we study some appropriate properties and the core of NTU-bankruptcy games. Generalizing the core cover and the reasonable set to the class of NTU-games, we show that NTU-bankruptcy games are compromise stable and reasonable stable. Moreover, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for anNTU-bankruptcy rule to be game theoretic.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Bankruptcy Games with Nontransferable Utility (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:92:y:2018:i:c:p:16-21

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.003

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