Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 92, issue C, 16-21
This paper analyzes bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptcy games with monetary payoffs. Following the game theoretic approach to NTU-bankruptcy problems, we study some appropriate properties and the core of NTU-bankruptcy games. Generalizing the core cover and the reasonable set to the class of NTU-games, we show that NTU-bankruptcy games are compromise stable and reasonable stable. Moreover, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for anNTU-bankruptcy rule to be game theoretic.
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