Bankruptcy Games with Nontransferable Utility
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Bas Dietzenbacher: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
No 2017-005, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
This paper analyzes bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptcy games with monetary payoffs. Following the game theoretic approach to NTU-bankruptcy problems, we study some appropriate properties and the core of NTU-bankruptcy games. Generalizing the core cover and the reasonable set to the class of NTU-games, we show that NTU-bankruptcy games are compromise stable and reasonable stable. Moreover, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU-bankruptcy rule to be game theoretic.
Keywords: NTU-bankruptcy problem,; NTU-bankruptcy game,; compromise stability,; reasonable stability; game theoretic bankruptcy rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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