All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints

Chen Cohen, Ofer Levi and Aner Sela

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 97, issue C, 18-23

Abstract: We study all-pay auctions with discrete strategy sets and analyze the equilibrium strategies when players have asymmetric values of winning as well as asymmetric effort constraints. We prove that for any number of players if one of them has the highest effort constraint then, independent of the players’ values of winning, he is the only player with a positive expected payoff. However, when two players have the same highest effort constraint then they do not necessarily have the highest expected payoffs. By several examples we show a significant distinction between the equilibrium strategies of two players and a larger number of players, particularly when the player with the highest effort constraint is not unique.

Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489618300805
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC EFFORT CONSTRAINTS (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:97:y:2019:i:c:p:18-23

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.10.003

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().