ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC EFFORT CONSTRAINTS
Ofer Levi and
Aner Sela ()
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Chen Cohen: Department of Management and Economics, The Open University of Israel, Israel
Ofer Levi: Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, The Open University of Israel, Israel
Aner Sela: BGU
No 1706, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics
Keywords: All-pay auctions; asymmetric effort constraints; asymmetric players; weakly asymmetric players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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