ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC EFFORT CONSTRAINTS

Chen Cohen, Ofer Levi and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
Chen Cohen: Department of Management and Economics, The Open University of Israel, Israel
Ofer Levi: Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, The Open University of Israel, Israel

No 1706, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Keywords: All-pay auctions; asymmetric effort constraints; asymmetric players; weakly asymmetric players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1706

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