A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets

Ata Atay and Marina Núñez ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 98, issue C, 10-14

Abstract: We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the μ-compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching μ may not be a von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:98:y:2019:i:c:p:10-14

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.12.002

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