Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

Laura Kasper, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 99, issue C, 36-42

Abstract: We identify the maximal voting correspondence which is Condorcet Consistent and satisfies two participation conditions, namely the Top Property and the Bottom Property — thereby extending a result in Pérez (2001). The former participation condition says that if an alternative is in the chosen set at a profile of rankings and a ranking is added with that alternative on top, then it remains to be a member of the chosen set. The latter says that if an alternative is not in the chosen set at a profile of rankings and a ranking is added with that alternative at bottom, then the alternative is again not in the chosen set. In particular, voting functions (single-valued voting correspondences) with these three properties select from this maximal correspondence, and we demonstrate several ways in which this can or cannot be done.

Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:99:y:2019:i:c:p:36-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.002

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