Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes

Laura Kasper, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

No 17, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We consider voting correspondences that are, besides Condorcet Consistent, immune against the two strong no show paradoxes. That is, it cannot happen that if an additional voter ranks a winning alternative on top then that alternative becomes loosing, and that if an additional voter ranks a loosing alternative at bottom then that alternative becomes winning. This immunity is called the Top Property in the first case and the Bottom Property in the second case. We establish the voting correspondence satisfying Condorcet Consistency and the Top Property, which is maximal in the following strong sense: it is the union of all smaller voting correspondences with these two properties. The result remains true if we add the Bottom Property but not if we replace the Top Property by the Bottom Property. This voting correspondence contains the Minimax Rule but it is strictly larger. In particular, voting functions (single-valued voting correspondences) that are Condorcet Consistent and immune against the two paradoxes must select from this maximal correspondence, and we demonstrate several ways in which this can or cannot be done.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017017

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017017

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