The political economy of sovereign defaults
Eugenia Andreasen (),
Guido Sandleris and
Alejandro Van der Ghote
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2019, vol. 104, issue C, 23-36
How do income distribution and the tax system affect sovereign borrowing and default decisions? Are these effects shaped by the political constraints that governments face when raising revenues to repay the debt? To address these questions, we incorporate agent heterogeneity, in terms of income distribution and tax burden, and a political support constraint into a standard DSGE model of sovereign default. The results show that income inequality and regressive taxes make defaults more likely for a given level of debt while they reduce sovereign borrowing in equilibrium. Tighter political support requirements reinforce these effects.
Keywords: Sovereign default; Fiscal policy; Inequality; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: The Political Economy of Sovereign Defaults (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:104:y:2019:i:c:p:23-36
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