The long-run information effect of central bank communication
Stephen Hansen,
Michael McMahon and
Matthew Tong
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2019, vol. 108, issue C, 185-202
Abstract:
Why do long-run interest rates respond to central bank communication? Whereas existing explanations imply a common set of signals drives short and long-run yields, we show that news on economic uncertainty can have increasingly large effects along the yield curve. To evaluate this channel, we use the publication of the Bank of England’s Inflation Report, from which we measure a set of high-dimensional signals. The signals that drive long-run interest rates do not affect short-run rates and operate primarily through the term premium. This suggests communication plays an important role in shaping perceptions of long-run uncertainty.
Keywords: Monetary policy; Communication; Machine learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C55 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (81)
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Working Paper: The long-run information effect of central bank communication (2020) 
Working Paper: The long-run information effect of central bank communication (2019) 
Working Paper: The Long-Run Information Effect of Central Bank Communication (2019) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:108:y:2019:i:c:p:185-202
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.09.002
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