On the perils of stabilizing prices when agents are learning
Antonio Mele,
Krisztina Molnár and
Sergio Santoro
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2020, vol. 115, issue C, 339-353
Abstract:
The main advantage of price level stabilization compared with inflation stabilization rests on the central bank’s ability to shape expectations. We show that stabilizing prices is no longer optimal when the central bank can shape expectations of agents with incomplete knowledge, who have to learn about the policy implemented. Disinflating in the short run more than agents expect generates short-term gains without triggering an abrupt loss of confidence, because agents update expectations sluggishly. Following this policy, in the long run, the central bank loses the ability to shape agents’ beliefs, and the economy converges to a rational expectations equilibrium in which policy does not stabilize prices, economic volatility is high, and agents suffer the corresponding welfare losses. However, these losses are outweighed by short-term gains from the learning phase.
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy; Price level stabilization; Inflation stabilization; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D83 D84 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the perils of stabilizing prices when agents are learning (2018) 
Working Paper: On the Perils of Stabilizing Prices when Agents are Learning (2015) 
Working Paper: On the perils of stabilizing prices when agents are learning (2015) 
Working Paper: On the perils of stabilizing prices when agents are learning (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:115:y:2020:i:c:p:339-353
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.006
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