Politically credible social insurance

Christopher Sleet and Sevin Yeltekin ()

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008, vol. 55, issue 1, 129-151

Abstract: This paper considers the political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:1:p:129-151

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