Politics and the Fed
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2011, vol. 58, issue 1, 39-48
In the standard policy model, a policymaker optimizes the welfare of a representative agent. In practice, policies are chosen in a political process by agents elected by voters. Drawing on evidence from my two-volume history of the Federal Reserve, the paper reports many examples of decisions influenced by political pressures. The history shows that the meaning of the independence of the Federal Reserve changed over time reflecting political influences.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:58:y:2011:i:1:p:39-48
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