A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance

Sagiri Kitao

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2014, vol. 68, issue C, 1-18

Abstract: A general equilibrium life-cycle model is developed, in which individuals choose a sequence of saving and labor supply faced with search frictions and uncertainty in longevity, health status and medical expenditures. Unemployed individuals decide whether to apply for disability insurance (DI) benefits if eligible. We investigate the effects of cash transfer and in-kind Medicare component of the DI system on the life-cycle employment. Without Medicare benefits, DI coverage could fall significantly. We also study how DI interacts with reforms of Social Security and Medicare and find that DI enrollment amplifies the effects of reforms.

Keywords: Disability insurance; Labor force participation; Life-cycle; Medicare; Unemployment insurance; Social security; Medicare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Working Paper: A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance (2013)
Working Paper: A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:68:y:2014:i:c:p:1-18

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.07.008

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