Unemployment insurance in a three-state model of the labor market

Aaron Popp

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 142-157

Abstract: The paper extends the model of Krusell et al. (2010) to study the welfare effects of unemployment insurance. The model unemployment insurance program includes four realistic features: 1) a 50% replacement rate up to a benefit cap; 2) finite duration of eligibility during a jobless spell; 3) limited eligibility; and 4) and an imperfectly monitored job search requirement. The model is parameterized to fit the size of scope of unemployment insurance in the United States. Removing unemployment insurance from the model leads to only a 0.1% consumption equivalent increase in average welfare. Simplifying assumptions about the structure of unemployment insurance, such as allowing all job losers to receive benefits, lead to much larger welfare effects similar to the effects found in the past literature. Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance requires careful modeling of the structure of the program.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Heterogeneous agents; Welfare effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:142-157

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.07.005

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