Evolution in minority games. (I). Games with a fixed strategy space

Yi Li, Rick Riolo and Robert Savit

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2000, vol. 276, issue 1, 234-264

Abstract: In this paper we study the minority game in the presence of evolution. In particular, we examine the behavior in games in which the dimension of the strategy space, m, is the same for all agents and fixed for all time. We find that for all values of m, not too large, evolution results in a substantial improvement in overall system performance. We also show that after evolution, results obey a scaling relation among games played with different values of m and different numbers of agents, analogous to that found in the non-evolutionary, adaptive games. Best system performance still occurs, for a given number of agents, at mc, the same value of the dimension of the strategy space as in the non-evolutionary case, but system performance is now nearly an order of magnitude better than the non-evolutionary result. For mDate: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437199004367
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:276:y:2000:i:1:p:234-264

DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(99)00436-7

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().