Social organization in the Minority Game model

František Slanina

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2000, vol. 286, issue 1, 367-376

Abstract: We study the role of imitation within the Minority Game model of market. The players can exchange information locally, which leads to formation of groups which act as if they were single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor agents result. We found that the global effectivity is optimized at certain value of the imitation probability, which decreases with increasing memory length. The social tensions are suppressed for large imitation probability, but generally the requirements of high global effectivity and low social tensions are in conflict.

Keywords: Minority game; Self-organization; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:286:y:2000:i:1:p:367-376

DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(00)00338-1

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