Colored minority games

Matteo Marsili and Maurizio Piai

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2002, vol. 310, issue 1, 234-244

Abstract: We study the behavior of simple models for financial markets with widely spread frequency either in the trading activity of agents or in the occurrence of basic events. The generic picture of a phase transition between information efficient and inefficient markets still persists even when agents trade on widely spread time-scales. We derive analytically the dependence of the critical threshold on the distribution of time-scales. We also address the issue of market efficiency as a function of frequency. In an inefficient market we find that the size of arbitrage opportunities is inversely proportional to the frequency of the events on which they occur. Greatest asymmetries in market outcomes are concentrated on the most rare events. The practical limits of the applications of these ideas to real markets are discussed in a specific example.

Keywords: Minority game; Financial market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:310:y:2002:i:1:p:234-244

DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)00800-2

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