Effects of imitation in a competing and evolving population

Hongjun Quan, Bing-Hong Wang and P.M. Hui

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2002, vol. 312, issue 3, 619-626

Abstract: We propose and study a modified version of the evolutionary minority game consisting of a competing population. Agents in the population are repeatedly competing to be in a minority and they have a common strategy. Each agent has a parameter p characterizing the probability that she is following the prediction of the common strategy. Agents are lined up in a one-dimensional chain with periodic boundary condition. Imitation is allowed among nearest neighboring agents. Numerical results show that the agents evolve into a state in which they self-segregate into opposite groups characterized by extreme behavior and imitation leads to considerable enhancement in the overall performance of the population.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:312:y:2002:i:3:p:619-626

DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)00963-9

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