Minority game with peer pressure

H.f Chau, F.k Chow and K.h Ho

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2004, vol. 332, issue C, 483-495

Abstract: To study the interplay between global market choice and local peer pressure, we construct a minority-game-like econophysical model. In this so-called networked minority game model, every selfish player uses both the historical minority choice of the population and the historical choice of one's neighbors in an unbiased manner to make decision. Results of numerical simulation show that the level of cooperation in the networked minority game differs remarkably from the original minority game as well as the prediction of the crowd–anticrowd theory. We argue that the deviation from the crowd–anticrowd theory is due to the negligence of the effect of a four point correlation function in the effective Hamiltonian of the system.

Keywords: Crowd-anti crowd theory; Game with local information; Minority game; Reduced strategy space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:332:y:2004:i:c:p:483-495

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2003.10.009

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