Diffusion of innovations in a social network under mixed Pareto–Nash strategies

M. Rodrı́guez-Achach, L. Casillas and F.J. Espinosa

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2004, vol. 335, issue 3, 671-676

Abstract: We study a simple model of diffusion of innovations in a network of agents that are characterized by their technological level. Agents can follow Nash or Pareto strategies when they decide whether to upgrade their level or not. We study the behavior of the average payoff per agent and the mean velocity of progress as function of the upgrading cost. We find that the strategy that maximizes the velocity of progress depends on the value of the upgrading cost, independently of the relative number of agents that use one or the other strategy.

Keywords: Evolutionary economic models; Social networks; Complex systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:335:y:2004:i:3:p:671-676

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2003.12.025

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