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The evolutionary minority game with local coordination

E. Burgos, Horacio Ceva and R.P.J. Perazzo

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2004, vol. 337, issue 3, 635-644

Abstract: We discuss a modification of the evolutionary minority game (EMG) in which agents are placed in the nodes of a regular or a random graph. A neighborhood for each agent can thus be defined and a modification of the usual relaxation dynamics can be made in which each agent updates her decision depending upon her neighborhood. We report numerical results for the topologies of a ring, a torus and a random graph changing the size of the neighborhood. We find the surprising result that in the EMG a better coordination (a lower frustration) can be achieved if agents base their actions on local information disregarding the global trend in the self-segregation process.

Keywords: Evolutionary minority game; Local coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:337:y:2004:i:3:p:635-644

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2004.02.005

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