Emergence of cooperation in an evolutionary game with two-level decisions

G. Acosta, S. Guala and Javier Marenco

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2004, vol. 343, issue C, 669-676

Abstract: We introduce an extended version of the classical minority game model, with two groups of agents: a group of leading players and a group of following players. The members of the first group can be related to the financial “gooroos”, who define market trends and are imitated by the members of the second group. This extension implements a two-level decision process, modelling a typical leadership behaviour of financial markets. We show by means of numerical experiments that the dynamics of this model leads to the emergence of coordination and organization patterns.

Keywords: Minority game; Two-level decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:343:y:2004:i:c:p:669-676

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2004.06.101

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