Minority mechanisms in models of agents learning collectively a resource level

Damien Challet

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2004, vol. 344, issue 1, 24-29

Abstract: Starting from the Minority Game and building more and more sophisticated models of adaptive agents, we show that minority mechanisms underly any model where agents learn collectively a resource level that can be either obvious and constant in time, obvious and time-varying, or hidden.

Keywords: Minority mechanisms; Resource level; Competition; Minority game; El Farol; Global ultimatum game; Credit risk models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:344:y:2004:i:1:p:24-29

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2004.06.082

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