A modified evolutionary minority game with local imitation

Lihui Shang and Xiao Fan Wang

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2006, vol. 361, issue 2, 643-650

Abstract: In this work, we consider a network of agents who compete for limited resources through a modified evolutionary minority game model based on Kauffman network. The properties of such a system for different values of mean connectivity K of the network are studied. Simulation results suggest that the agents also tend to self-segregate into opposing groups characterized by extreme actions, and show that the agents can coordinate their behavior effectively in the system with K=2. Enhanced cooperation occurs also for a generalization of the model to multiple-choice evolutionary minority games in which the agents are allowed to choose among several options.

Keywords: Evolutionary minority game; Imitation; Self-segregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:361:y:2006:i:2:p:643-650

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2005.07.018

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