Playing the hypothesis testing minority game in the maximal reduced strategy space
H.F. Chau,
V.H. Chan and
F.K. Chow
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2008, vol. 387, issue 23, 5874-5886
Abstract:
Hypothesis Testing Minority Game (HMG) is a variant of the standard Minority Game (MG) that models the inertial behavior of agents in the market. In the earlier study of our group, we find that agents cooperate better in HMG than in the standard MG when strategies are picked from the full strategy space. Here we continue to study the behavior of HMG when strategies are chosen from the maximal reduced strategy space. Surprisingly, we find that, unlike the standard MG, the level of cooperation in HMG depends strongly on the strategy space used. In addition, a novel intermittency dynamics is also observed in the minority choice time series in a certain parameter range in which the orderly phases are characterized by a variety of periodic dynamics. Remarkably, all these findings can be explained by the crowd–anticrowd theory.
Keywords: Crowd–anticrowd theory; Global cooperation; Hypothesis testing; Minority game; Periodic dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:387:y:2008:i:23:p:5874-5886
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2008.06.047
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