Preferential selection promotes cooperation in a spatial public goods game
Dong-Mei Shi,
Han-Xin Yang,
Mao-Bin Hu,
Wen-Bo Du,
Bing-Hong Wang and
Xian-Bin Cao
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2009, vol. 388, issue 21, 4646-4650
Abstract:
We introduce a preferential selection mechanism into a spatial public goods game where players are located on a square lattice. Each individual chooses one of its neighbors as a reference with a probability proportional to exp(Py∗A), where Py is the neighbor’s payoff and A (≥0) is a tunable parameter. It is shown that the introduction of such a preferential selection can remarkably promote the emergence of cooperation over a wide range of the multiplication factor. We find that the mean payoffs of cooperators along the boundary are higher than that of defectors and cooperators form larger clusters as A increases. The extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.
Keywords: Cooperation; Public goods game; Preferential selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:388:y:2009:i:21:p:4646-4650
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2009.07.031
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