 Constrained information minority game: How was the night at El Farol?Bernardo C. Lustosa and Daniel Cajueiro Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2010, vol. 389, issue 6, 1230-1238 Abstract: We introduce a variation of the El Farol Game in which the only players who surely know the outcome of the last turn of the game are those who actually attended the bar. Other players may receive this information with reduced probability. This information can be transmitted by another player who actually attended the bar in the last turn of the game or from the media. We show that since this game is not organized around the socially optimal point, arbitrage opportunities may arise. Therefore, we study how these opportunities can be exploited by an agent. An interesting application of this model is the market of goods being auctioned, such as cars being repossessed. The results obtained here seem to closely reflect the dynamics of this market in Brazil. Keywords: Arbitrage; Different histories; El Farol Bar problem; Minority games (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:389:y:2010:i:6:p:1230-1238 DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.034 Access Statistics for this article Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier |
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