Dynamic allocation of investments promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

Haifeng Zhang, Dongmei Shi, Runran Liu and Binghong Wang

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2012, vol. 391, issue 8, 2617-2622

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a dynamic allocation investment mechanism into the spatial public goods game. In the model, if a cooperator i collects more payoffs from one group centered on the player j in the last round, he will put more investments to the group in the next round. The intensity of investment is controlled by a tunable parameter α. Simulation results show that the emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted, and a larger α induces a higher cooperation level. These interesting phenomena are then extensively explained by pairwise investments, average payoffs and evolution snapshots.

Keywords: Public goods game; Dynamic allocation mechanism; Cooperation level (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:391:y:2012:i:8:p:2617-2622

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2011.12.005

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